A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies

We uncover a new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies by mechanisms that satisfy the “best element property” where for each agent, there exists a strategy profile that gives him the highest payoff in the mechanism. This class includes finite and regular mechanisms. We conclude that either the quasilinearity-like assumptions of available sufficiency results cannot be completely dispensed with or some mechanisms that do not satisfy the best element property must be employed. We term the condition “restricted deception-proofness.” It requires that, in environments with identical preferences, the social choice function be immune to all deceptions, making it then stronger than incentive compatibility. In some environments the conditions for (exact or approximate) implementation by mechanisms satisfying the best element property are more restrictive than previously thought.     

Optimal size, optimal timing and optimal financing of an investment

Corporate investment is an important determinant of economic well-being. The existing literature identifies optimal investment size and timing without the possibility of debt financing, as well as the effect of debt financing on investment timing without the option to choose investment size. This paper contributes to the literature by identifying the optimal size, optimal timing and optimal financing for an investment when the firm controls all three decisions (as it usually does in practice). The investment size and investment trigger are generally positively related: when investment is delayed (accelerated) it is larger (smaller) in size, thus the overall effect on investment is ambiguous. However, when tax rate or bankruptcy cost is increased, the trigger rises and size falls, hence the effect on investment is unambiguously negative. The effect of debt financing on investment depends on the amount of debt used; with the optimal amount of debt, investment is delayed relative to the no-debt case, and this delay can be economically significant; however, the investment, when eventually made, will be larger in size. Overall, it is not appropriate to ignore either the firm’s ability to choose investment size or its option to use debt financing, when modeling the investment decision.     

The effects of environmental taxes and quotas on the optimal timing of emission reductions under Choquet–Brownian uncertainty

The effects of two environmental policy options for the reduction of pollution emissions, i.e. taxes and non-tradable quotas, are analyzed. In contrast to the prior literature this work endogenously takes into account the level of emissions before and after the adoption of the new environmental policy. The level of emissions is determined by solving the firm's profit maximization problem under taxes and fixed quotas. We find that the optimal adoption threshold under taxes is always larger than the adoption threshold under fixed quota, even in a setting characterized by ecological uncertainty and ambiguity – in the form of Choquet–Brownian motions – on future costs and benefits over adopting environmental policies.     

R&D, risks and overreaction in a market with the absence of the book-to-market effect

Prior studies document that the book-to-market (BM) effect is absent in the Taiwan stock market. Using Taiwanese data covering from 1991 to 2006, we show that, after controlling for the size effect and the Fama and French's (1993) risk factors, the BM effect only exists for those firms with low R&D intensity essentially because these stocks suffer less from investors’ underreaction to R&D investment. The BM effect arises primarily from fundamental reversals acting as a proxy for investors’ overreaction.     

Forecasting the volatility of S&P depositary receipts using GARCH-type models under intraday range-based and return-based proxy measures

We employ four various GARCH-type models, incorporating the skewed generalized t (SGT) errors into those returns innovations exhibiting fat-tails, leptokurtosis and skewness to forecast both volatility and value-at-risk (VaR) for Standard & Poor's Depositary Receipts (SPDRs) from 2002 to 2008. Empirical results indicate that the asymmetric EGARCH model is the most preferable according to purely statistical loss functions. However, the mean mixed error criterion suggests that the EGARCH model facilitates option buyers for improving their trading position performance, while option sellers tend to favor the IGARCH/EGARCH model at shorter/longer trading horizon. For VaR calculations, although these GARCH-type models are likely to over-predict SPDRs' volatility, they are, nevertheless, capable of providing adequate VaR forecasts. Thus, a GARCH genre of model with SGT errors remains a useful technique for measuring and managing potential losses on SPDRs under a turbulent market scenario.     

Cyclical wage movements in emerging markets compared to developed economies: The role of interest rates

This paper documents that, at the aggregate level, (i) real wages are positively correlated with output and, on average, lag output by about one quarter in emerging markets, while there are no systematic patterns in developed economies, and (ii) real wage volatility (relative to output volatility) is about twice as high in emerging markets compared with developed economies. We then present a small open economy model with productivity shocks and countercyclical interest rates. The model incorporates a working capital requirement and the Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) preference that allows for flexible parameterization of the strength of income effects on labor supply. The model can account for the high volatility of wage and consumption relative to output and countercyclical trade balances that characterize emerging-market economies. During economic downturns, rising interest rates in emerging markets induce relatively large income effects on labor supply, so households would not reduce their labor input as much even though wages drop significantly.     

Do interest groups affect US immigration policy?

While anecdotal evidence suggests that interest groups play a key role in shaping immigration policy, there is no systematic empirical analysis of this issue. In this paper, we construct an industry-level dataset for the United States, by combining information on the number of temporary work visas with data on lobbying activity associated with immigration. We find robust evidence that both pro- and anti-immigration interest groups play a statistically significant and economically relevant role in shaping migration policy across sectors. Barriers to migration are lower in sectors in which business interest groups incur larger lobbying expenditures and higher in sectors where labor unions are more important.     

A state-dependent model of intermediate goods pricing

Recent analyses of transaction-level data sets have generated new stylized facts on price setting and greatly influenced the empirical open- and closed-economy macroeconomics literatures. This work has uncovered marked heterogeneity in price stickiness, demonstrated that even non-zero price changes do not fully “pass through” exchange rate shocks, and offered evidence of synchronization in the timing of price changes. Further, intrafirm prices have been shown to differ from arm's length prices in each of these characteristics. This paper develops a state-dependent model of price setting by strategic intermediate goods producers that anticipate and respond to their competitors' actions. The model, which allows for both arm's length and intrafirm transactions, is able to generate all of these empirical pricing patterns.     

Cooperative fiscal policy at the zero lower bound

This paper investigates the use of fiscal policy in response to a large negative aggregate demand shock which may push the global economy into a liquidity trap. Fiscal policy may be an effective tool to respond to a liquidity trap, but its international spillover effects may operate quite differently from its domestic effects. We derive the optimal cooperative fiscal response to a global liquidity trap in a two country world economy. Surprisingly, we find that the optimal fiscal spending response for a partner country to a negative aggregate demand shock in a source country may be negative. If fiscal policy can be chosen under policy commitment, the optimal response involves current fiscal expansion combined with future fiscal contraction, after the liquidity trap has ended.